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Abstract. 
The Net Present Value maximizing model has a respectable ancestry and is considered by most 
scholars a theoretically sound decision model. In real-life applications, decision makers use the NPV rule, 
but apply a subjectively determined hurdle rate, as opposed to the allegedly correct opportunity cost of 
capital. According to a heuristics-and-biases-program approach, this implies that the hurdle-rate rule is a 
biased heuristic. This papers shows that the hurdle-rate rule may be interpreted as a fruitful strategy of 
bounded rationality,  where several important element are integrated and condensed into an aspiration level. 
This paper also addresses the issue of a fruitful cooperation between bounded and unbounded rationality, of 
which the heuristic NPV is one significant example.  
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Investment decisions, net present value and bounded rationality 
 
Introduction 
This paper deals with the Net Present Value (NPV) methodology, a widely used tool for investment 
decisions. It is considered theoretically sound and normatively suggested in many corporate finance 
textbooks (see Copeland & Weston, 1988; Bierman & Smidt, 1992; Rao, 1992; Damodaran, 1999; 
Copeland, Koller & Murrin, 2000; Brealey & Myers, 2000; Fernández, 2002).  The concept of NPV is the 
brick of a normative building deep-rooted in the maximizing tradition of economics. The NPV methodology 
may be summarized as follows: suppose a decision maker holds a sum X and is willing to invest it for one 
period. Suppose she has the opportunity of investing X0 in a one-period project generating a payoff X1 after 
one period. Let r  be the return rate of the next-best alternative available to the investor; the decision maker 
should invest in the project if and only if 
 
rXXX >− 01 .      (1) 
Eq. (1) may be rewritten as  
0
)1(
1
0 >++− r
XX .      (2) 
The left-hand side of (2) is called the project’s Net Present Value. The NPV rule says that the decision 
maker should invest in the project if its NPV is positive. The discount rate r  is the so-called opportunity 
cost of capital: if a decision maker invests in the project she foregoes the opportunity of earning r  on her 
capital X0. It is the rate of return of the best available alternative other than the one under consideration. The 
opportunity cost of capital is then taken as a norm (in the sense of Kahneman & Miller, 1986). In general, if 
one faces two or more mutually exclusive courses of action, one should calculate their NPVs by discounting 
cash flows at the respective opportunity cost of capital and choose the one with the highest NPV. The NPV 
model traces back to Fisher (1930), whose analysis is carried out under assumption of certainty. It may be 
formally derived from the following constrained optimization problem, where the investor must select the 
optimal consumption plan:  
 
11100010 )1)((  subject to),(max cXmrcXmccu =+++−−    (3) 
 
where u(·) denotes the investor’s utility function, r is the market interest rate and ct, mt, and Xt  are, 
respectively, the consumption, the income, and the investment flow at time  t = 1, 2. Eq. (3) formally 
describes the so-called Fisher model, which provides for a separation theorem (optimal investment plan is 
the same regardless of the optimal consumption bundle) and for a derivation of the net present value rule as 
 2
in eq. (2) (see McMinn, 2005). Under uncertainty, we cannot say a priori that, for example, an expected 
return of 100 is better than an expected return of 90 if the former is riskier than the latter. None of the two 
dominates the other: one is preferable in terms of return, the other one is preferable in terms of risk (risk-
aversion is assumed). So, if our alternatives are not equivalent in risk, the NPV rule may not be employed 
as such, because it only creates a partial ordering among alternatives. There is the need of finding a 
theoretically correct cost of capital accounting for the riskiness of the project. Unanimously, the opportunity 
cost of capital “should equal the return the investor could have earned on other investment opportunities 
with comparable risk characteristics” (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 114). Among other models, portfolio 
theory (Markowitz, 1952) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Mossin, 1966) have 
been developed in corporate finance for explaining the relation between risk and return. The mathematical 
link between these models and the NPV rule has been provided by several scholars, who consistently prove 
that maximization of shareholders wealth is equivalent to NPV maximization, where the cost of capital r in 
eq. (2) is computed by making use of the CAPM’s security market line (see Tuttle & Litzenberger, 1968; 
Hamada, 1969; Bierman & Hass, 1973; Mossin, 1969; Rubinstein, 1973).  
A more recent version of the NPV rule is the “expanded NPV” (Trigeorgis, 1986, Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994), which makes use of arbitrage pricing or, alternatively, stochastic dynamic programming. It aims at 
taking into account possible options intrinsic in the project (option to wait, to abandon, to switch, to 
temporarily suspend, to enlarge scale, etc.). Proponents of the expanded NPV often call their approach “real 
options approach”, which is but a sophisticated version of the traditional NPV model, where the set of 
alternatives is inclusive of the options implicit in the project: “one can always redefine NPV by subtracting 
from the conventional calculation the opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest, and then say that 
the rule  ‘invest if NPV is positive’ holds once this correction has been made”  (Dixit and Pindyck p. 7). In 
other words, while the label ‘real options approach’ is widespread in the literature, “if others prefer to 
continue to use ‘positive NPV’ terminology, that is fine as long as they are careful to include all relevant 
option values in their definition of NPV” (p. 7).1 
Past and recent empirical evidence shows that actual decision makers turn the NPV model to a rule 
of thumb: they use a subjective discount rate as opposed to a rational cost of capital derived from some 
market model (e.g. CAPM, arbitrage theory). As a result, they employ a criterion generated in the realm of 
unbounded rationality but give it a distinctive bounded-rationality flavor. This paper aims at showing that 
this mixed rule may prove useful: the bounded/unbounded dichotomy peters out and the hybrid rule 
discloses a beneficial cooperation between bounded and unbounded rationality.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 surveys some empirical evidence on the use of hurdle 
rates by real-life decision makers so that the NPV rule is interpretable as a bounded-rationality strategy.  
Section 2 presents evidence that the hurdle-rate NPV rule may furnishes close-to-optimal results when 
compared with the expanded NPV and that it may be viewed as a comprehensive methodology that takes 
                                           
1 A precursory example of the use of NPV for valuing real options may be found in Merrett & Sykes (1973, p. 129) 
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account of several domain-specific and project-specific variables. Section 3 shows that the allegedly sound 
maximizing NPV may encounter some problems, among which inconsistencies with accepted standards of 
rationality. Section 4 presents some evidence indicating that the NPV rule is hardly interpretable as 
rigorously pertaining to either side of rationality. Some remarks conclude the paper. 
 
1. The hurdle-rate heuristic 
There is some awareness in the corporate finance literature that actual decision makers use the NPV rule but 
do not use the cost of capital suggested by corporate finance textbooks. They employ a subjective hurdle 
rate. Brigham (1975) surveyed 33 large, relatively sophisticated firms. Although 94% of them used DCF 
methodology, only 61% of the firms using DCF adopted the cost of capital as the discount rate. Summers 
(1987) surveyed corporations on investment decision criteria finding that 94% of reporting firms use the 
NPV rule employing a discount rate independent of risk, which is suggestive of the use of hurdle rates. 
Dixit (1992) recognizes that “firms invest in projects that they expect to yield a return in excess of a 
required or ‘hurdle’ rate” (p. 107). “Finance scholars have always been puzzled by the durability of … the 
hurdle rate rule” (Ross, 1995) and, in actual facts, “we know that hurdle rates ... are used in practice” 
(McDonald, 2000, p. 30); “it appears common for firms to use investment criteria that do not strictly 
implement the NPV criterion” (ibidem, p. 13), so that their “actions do not reflect the application of current 
financial theory” (Gitman & Mercurio, 1982, p. 29). Graham and Harvey (2002)  surveyed 392 companies 
and point out that “small firms are significantly less likely to use the NPV criterion or the capital asset 
pricing model and its variants” (p. 22). They find that sometimes the use of hurdle rates is explicitly 
acknowledged: “small firms were inclined to use a cost of equity determined by “what investors tell us to 
require” [and a] majority (in fact, nearly 60%) of the companies said that they would use a single-company 
wide discount rate to evaluate a new investment project, even though different projects are likely to have 
different risk characteristics” (p. 12). Jagannathan and Meier (2002) (henceforth J&M)2  observe that 
“managers use a … hurdle rate” (p. 3) in making decisions, instead of employing a CAPM-derived cost of 
capital. Relying on Poterba and Summers’ (1995) analysis, they find that “hurdle rates are not … linked to 
the cost of capital” (p. 22). These findings suggest that actual choice behaviors deviate from the normative 
NPV and decision makers interpret the rule as a satisficing strategy (Simon, 1955), letting the discount rate 
be a predetermined cutoff level which is considered satisfactory. Denote with i  the (expected) rate of return 
of the project at hand, and let k be a hurdle rate subjectively prefixed by the evaluator. A simple heuristic is 
the following: undertake the project if ki > , otherwise search for another alternative until the inequality is 
satisfied. It is evident that such a rule may also be rephrased in terms of NPV, with the hurdle rate k  as the 
discount rate. That is, the decision maker will accept an investment with initial outlay X0 and (expected) 
final return X1 if (and only if) 0)1/(10 >++− kXX  with )1(01 iXX += : the investment will be 
                                           
2 All following quotations from J&M (2002) refer to the internet version. 
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undertaken if its NPV at the rate k  is positive, where k represents the minimum rate of return acceptable 
by the investor. This rule is formally analogous to eq. (2) but is cognitively different. Replacing r  with 
k means shifting from the idea of comparing equivalent-risk alternatives to the idea of accepting a 
satisfactory rate of return. Both r and k  are cutoff rates, but the former refers to an objectively determined 
equivalent-risk alternative, the latter refers to a subjectively determined aspiration level. So doing, one 
leaves the realm of unbounded rationality (UR) and reaches the land of bounded rationality (BR). Yet, both 
equations are expression of an NPV criterion, relying as they are on discounting cash flows at a prefixed 
discount rate.  The investor invests in the project if the value of her payoff function, calculated at the hurdle 
rate k , is positive; that is, if the rate of return of the project exceeds the aspiration level k . By adopting the 
hurdle-rate heuristic she does not confine herself to equivalent-risk alternatives (though risk and uncertainty 
may well be one of the factors considered in the determination of k). No alternative course of action is 
called up, no comparison is accomplished, no maximization is involved.3 The rate k  is not a rate of return 
of an existing alternative, and therefore it is not an opportunity cost and does not represent a foregone 
return. It is a subjective threshold that identifies the personal minimum required rate of return from the 
project. The heuristic-minded reasoner is uninterested in knowing whether there exists or not an alternative 
(either equivalent in risk or not) better than the one under examination, she is just interested in reaching that 
aspiration level, for subjective reasons.  
 
2. Does the NPV heuristic work? 
One of the studies dealing with the performance of the hurdle-rate rule is McDonald (2000). The author 
aims at investigating “whether the use of seemingly arbitrary investment criteria, such as hurdle rates and 
profitability indexes, can proxy for the use of more sophisticated real options valuation” (p. 13). He 
wonders whether such “simple rules are relatively robust to changes in project characteristics” and whether 
“a single hurdle-rate rule [can] yield approximately correct decisions for these projects” (p. 15). Focusing 
on an option-to-wait decision problem,  and implementing variations in the cash-flow growth rate, the 
project volatility, the discount rate, he shows that 
for a wide range of project characteristics, fixed-hurdle rate and profitability index rule can provide 
 a good approximation to optimal investment timing decisions, in the sense that the ex ante loss from 
 following the suboptimal rule is small; it is possible to follow the wrong investment rule without 
 losing much of the ex ante value of the investment timing option. In fact, as the investment timing 
 option becomes worth more and it becomes optimal to wait longer to invest, the option value 
 becomes less sensitive to errors in investment rules.” (p. 15) 
 
He explains that even if the rise in the discount rate lowers the project value, it also lowers the value at 
which investment becomes optimal, so that “a decision rule of the form ‘invest when the project has an 
internal rate of return of 20%’ might in fact be appropriate for a wide variety of projects” (p. 15). He 
underlines that “for a variety of parameters, particular hurdle-rate … rules can provide close-to-optimal 
                                           
3 Maximization implies comparison: a comparison among mutually exclusive states. 
 5
investment decisions. Thus, it may be that firms using seemingly arbitrary ‘rules of thumb’ are 
approximating optimal decisions” (p. 13, italics added). J&M (2002) reach the same conclusion holding that 
that the use of hurdle rates should not be deemed less reliable than the use of the opportunity cost of capital 
as a discount rate: “managers … [take] the right decisions … because they use a hurdle rate that is higher 
than the cost of capital to capture the option to wait” (p. 12).4 Although these authors do not recommend the 
use of aspiration levels and rules of thumb as optimal decisions making criteria5 it is worthwhile noting that 
their conclusions implicitly (and unawarely) foster the idea that advantages can be taken from undertaking a 
simple heuristic: 
[a] “the advantage of using a hurdle rate is that modelling all possible future options is not necessary” 
(J&M, 2002, p. 4) and decision makers may “find it useful to use a rule that best justifies making intuitively 
plausible investment  decisions” (McDonald, 2000, p. 26) 
[b] “managers adjust these rules … when an investment is strategic and expiring.” (McDonald, 2000, p. 30, 
italics added). 
[c] “use [of a hurdle-rate rule] in practice might stem from the success of apparently arbitrary rules that are 
revealed over time to be close to optimal. Managers likely observe the capital budgeting practices, in their 
own and other companies, and in many cases probably mimic what seems to work” (McDonald, 2000, p. 30, 
italics added). 
It is worth noting that [a], [b] and [c] fit the three premises on which Gigerenzer (2001) bases his notion of 
adaptive toolbox: 
[A] psychological plausibility: models of decision-making should have adequate regard “for the constraints 
in time, knowledge, and computational capacities that humans face” (Gigerenzer, 2001, p. 38) 
[B] domain specificity: “each heuristic is specialized for certain classes of problems, which means that most 
of them are not applicable in a given situation” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 32) and “what works to make 
quick and accurate inferences in one domain may well not work in another. Thus, different environments 
can have different … heuristics” (Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Research Group, 1999, p. 18) 
[C] ecological rationality: this consists in “the match between the structure of a  heuristic and the structure 
of an environment” (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001a, p. 9). Heuristics are ecologically rational in that “they are 
adapted to particular environments … [and] can be fast, frugal and accurate by exploiting the structure of 
information in natural environments” (ibidem). 
                                           
4 Some other authors are puzzled by the “intriguing paradox” (Miller & Shapira, 2004, p. 281) of such near-optimal 
choice behaviors: “we have compelling evidence that managers … often do not use real option techniques … On the 
other hand, strategic decisions under uncertainty  appear to conform to some general expectations based on real option 
theory … The resolution of this paradox would seem to be that, despite their biases, managers’ strategic investment 
decisions can loosely conform to normative real options models. Managers may employ real option reasoning, without 
getting all the details correct … Managers’ investment decisions may be ‘directionally correct’, even if they are not 
completely unbiased” (Miller & Shapira, 2004, p. 281). Actually, an ‘intriguing paradox’ is that the authors, in the 
concluding remarks of their papers, admit that actual choice behaviors take account of variables that are not considered 
by the normative models: “normative models for pricing options overlook key aspects of the behavioral and 
organizational contexts in which investment decisions occur” (Miller & Shapira, 2004, p. 282) 
5  “We do not suggest that managers should use these rules of thumb” (McDonald, 2000, p. 30). 
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Sentences in [a] exemplify the psychological plausibility [A] of the NPV heuristic (decision makers are not 
able to take into account all possible future opportunities and outcomes). Sentence [b] reveals that these 
rules are domain-specific [B] in the sense that when the context changes (strategic investments versus 
nonstrategic investments, expiring versus nonexpiring projects) the rule is changed or is combined with 
other rules of thumb6 (and that the aspiration levels are adjusted too, as suggested by J&M. See above). For 
example, while the NPV heuristic seems to work well for a variety of industrial projects, the recognition 
heuristic (Borges et al., 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002; Borges et al., forthcoming) is 
inapplicable in such frameworks.7 Also, the hurdle-rate rule seems to work least well in case of low 
volatility. The errors may be avoided through a combination of rules (e.g. hurlde-rate and profitability 
index) to give rise to a different heuristic: “This suggests constructing a third rule as a hybrid of the two 
rules … Such a hybrid rule can prevent the large errors at extreme discount rates generated by either rule 
alone … this example … demonstrates that firms in practice might find it useful to … consider multiple  
rules at once” (McDonald, 2000, p. 26). Sentence [c] reveals that the use of the NPV heuristic is 
ecologically rational [C] due to success over time. McDonald’s words also implicitly suggest that the rules 
of thumb analyzed may be the result of imitation and social learning. In other terms, his words encourage 
the view that the satisficing NPV rule is a “do-what-others-do” (or “do-what-successful-people-do”) 
strategy (see Laland, 2001). J&M (2000) cites empirical researches showing that managers do not use the 
CAPM-derived cost of capital, contrary to the normative suggestion of most corporate finance textbooks. 
Decision makers apply hurdle rates which are usually higher that the cost of capital. As in McDonald 
(2000), the value of waiting to invest is underlined to explain this finding: the authors affirm that by “using 
high hurdle rates, companies in fact indirectly account for the existence of timing options” (p. 15). Resting 
on Poterba and Summers’ (1995) data, they show that “a relatively high hurdle rate of 12.2.% is successful 
in capturing most of the option value as long as the uncertainty of projects’ cash flows is high” (J&M, 2002, 
p. 18) and “If we take into account the option to delay the project, the financial decision is no longer 
crucially dependent on an exact figure of the discount rate” (p. 19). However, there are other explanations, 
which suggest that the use of hurdle rates is consistent with established theories in business and finance. For 
example, a project may absorb managerial skills and thus prevent firm from undertaking other profitable 
projects in the future. Thus, “If managerial time of a skilful manager is limited, she must decide when it is 
optimal to take a project. It may pay off to wait and not take the next best positive net present value project” 
(p. 21), which explains why “the use of a hurdle rate that is higher than the cost of capital … is likely to 
lead to near optimal decisions” (ibidem). This also explains the large variation that Poterba and Summers 
(1995) find in the hurdle rate of different companies: firms in the same sector face similar systematic risks 
and, therefore, if they complied with the CAPM-derived discount rate (based on systematic risk) they would 
apply similar discount rates. It is appropriate to use higher discount rates because managerial resources are 
                                           
6 McDonald is actually concerned with three rules of thumb: hurdle-rate, profitability indexes and payback period. 
7 Possibly, the reverse is true for investment in capital markets. 
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in limited supply. This view is consistent with the resource-based theory and the literature on Top 
Management Teams, according to which managerial skills is a fundamental driver of value creation 
(Barney, 1986, 1991, 2001; Grant, 1991; Grant & Robert, 1995; Levinthal, 1995; Bromiley, 2005). 
Furthermore, if a project is strategic, it may be worth undertaking it even if its NPV (computed with the 
“correct” cost of capital) is negative, because it promises future opportunities. In this case the use of a 
discount rate smaller than the cost of capital should be appropriate. Actually, J&M (2002) do affirm that 
“companies use low hurdle rates for strategic projects” (p. 22); and “Because it is difficult to estimate the 
values of all possible upcoming investment opportunities and to assign probabilities how likely these will 
arise, companies seem to use a low hurdle rate that takes into account that the payoffs in the future are 
possibly higher than the strategic investment itself suggests” (ibidem). This view is consistent with the 
strategy literature, according to which strategic decisions are drivers for a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Collis & Montgomery, 1995; Quinn & Mintzberg, 1996); “there are strategic situations where 
making the first move has a commitment value” (Dixit, 1992, p. 119). For this type of decisions the use of 
modelling is hardly hepful: “Even if highly simplified and abstracted, the associated SA [strategic assets] 
decision may not be solvable in closed-form equilibrium … For example, when modelled as a differential 
game, the problem will probably be not tractable” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 40). Agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) and the existence of costs of external financing may play a role in 
determining a hurdle rate different from normative cost of capital. J&M construct a comprehensive NPV 
function taking account agency costs and the costs of external financing. The authors claim that this is, 
according to some recent literature, the right NPV model to be maximized (pp. 23-27). That the costs of 
external financing may play a major role is also suggested by some empirical research about large reserves 
of cash retained in the firm (see Mikkelson & Parch, 1999) .  
As seen, the option value of waiting tend to increase the hurdle rate as well, whereas  strategic 
considerations tend to decrease it. Brigham (1975) report that 39% of the respondents change the hurdle rate 
less than once in a year (p. 20, Exhibit 4), and 32% state that it “depends on conditions”: they “revise rates 
to reflect product and capital market condition, with revisions generally occurring less than once a year” (p. 
20). Gitman and Mercurio (1982) report that 50.3% of the companies revise discount rates when 
environmental conditions change and 13% less frequently than annually, 11.2%  when a major project is 
evaluated (p. 27). The ‘product and market condition’ seems to hint at Porter’s (1980) analysis, where 
market conditions such as rivalry, supplier power, buyer power, threat of substitutes, entry barriers are 
individuated as fundamental drivers for value creation. Overall, these findings evidence that hurdle rates are 
seen as reference levels that do not change quickly but “that may be gradually adjusted if they become too 
lax or binding a constraint” (Goodie et al., 1999, p. 351). Historical documents as well reveal that the 
hurdle-rate rule, frequently used in past centuries, were used as base levels that could be adjusted: “If 15% 
tended to be the rule of thumb, it was not applied slavishly by the viewers” (Brackenborough, McLean & 
Oldroyd, 2001, p. 144), which changed it “depending on  the circumstances” (p. 143) (see also Section 4 
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below). In other words, decision makers condense into an aspiration level several considerations related to 
uncertainty, decision flexibility, market conditions, future opportunities, limited managerial skills, agency 
costs, strategic considerations, but the BR-NPV rule is exploited in a nonrigid way so that the hurdle rate 
changes as the above factors change.  
 
3. Problems in the unboundedly rational  NPV 
The UR-NPV rule has several shortcomings. First of all, there is no one UR-NPV, but a proliferation of 
UR-NPVs differing din terms of risk measure implied, equilibrium model employed, mathematical 
technique adopted.8 There is no agreement among scholars on the way the NPV technique should be 
implemented: “academics do not agree on an appropriate equilibrium model even for estimating firm-level 
discount rates, for which stock returns are observable; estimation of project-level discount rates is even 
more problematic” (McDonald, 2000, p. 21). Whatever the notion of risk, the equilibrium model prescribed, 
the mathematical tool employed, many of the assumptions required to implement it are often violated in real 
life. For example, the use of CAPM-derived cost of capital is often fostered in corporate finance.  Resting 
on a considerable amount of empirical results, J&M  (2002) show that “the CAPM, like all models, is only 
an abstraction from reality” (p. 5) and “there have been many academic challenges to the validity of the 
CAPM as applied in practice” (ibidem). Lander and Pincher (1998) find numerous disadvantages even in 
the use of the more sophisticated real-options approach (expanded NPV). They write: 
“Any decision-making framework model is subject to: inappropriate assumptions … poor 
 estimation procedures …failure to incorporate the effects of competition and the strengths and 
 weakness of the firm into all aspects of the investment opportunity, ineffective information 
 gathering of performance and measurement systems,  inappropriate emphasis on short-run goals and 
 results, or excessive conservatism or optimism … Many of the required modeling assumptions are 
 often and consistently violated in a practical real options application. The necessary additional 
 assumptions required for mathematical tractability limit the scope of applicability” (Lander & 
 Pinches, pp. 542-543)  
 
A most stringent assumption frequently used is completeness of the market. This assumption makes it 
possible to construct a replicating portfolio which mimics the project’s payoffs. In this case the expected 
rate of return of the portfolio is taken as the cost of capital and a positive NPV indicates that, regardless of 
preferences, the investor benefits from undertaking the project by selling short the replicating portfolio. The 
approach is often called the options pricing approach. It should be stressed that short sales are often not 
allowed and, when allowed, arbitrageurs are inevitably exposed to risk of losses (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), 
contrary to what textbook arbitrage suggests.  Above all, if markets are incomplete and the project is not 
replicable by existing assets, there is no way of computing the cost of capital, given that “without spanning, 
there is no theory for determining the ‘correct’ value for the discount rate ρ” (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 
                                           
8 The (unboundedly rational) fuzzy-logic version of the NPV is now another version, now commonplace in numerous 
disciplines (Ward, 1989; Chiu & Park, 1994; Abdel-Kader, Dugdale & Taylor, 1998; Buckley, Eslami & Feuring, 
2002). The meaning of a fuzzy cost of capital and a fuzzy NPV is, admittedly, an open issue. 
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152). Smith and Nau (1995) admit that “without a market equivalent for the efficiency uncertainty, we 
cannot construct a perfect replicating trading strategy or identify a unique risk-neutral probability 
distribution and thus we cannot determine a unique option-pricing value for the project.” (p. 804).9 They 
illustrate an example where three strategies are possible and conclude that “the optimal strategy is unclear 
and all three strategies are potentially optimal” (p. 805).10 
The heuristics-and-biases-program approach may reveal itself a double-edge weapon. For example, 
among the various equilibrium models, “the predominant approach to estimating the cost of capital is to use 
the CAPM” (J&M, 2002, p. 28). The CAPM is massively endorsed in corporate finance (e.g. Copeland & 
Weston, 1983; Brealey & Myers, 2000; Koller, Goedhart  & Wessels, 2005; Damodaran, 2006). ‘‘The 
CAPM provides a framework for estimating the appropriate opportunity cost to be used in evaluating an 
investment’’ (Rao, 1992, p. 33). Rubinstein (1973, footnote 10) proves that, if the CAPM assumptions are 
met, the project is profitable if and only if ( ) 0101 /~,~cov1/ XrXrXX mf λ+>− , that is if the project’s 
expected return rate exceeds the CAPM-derived cost of capital.11 The author underlines that the cost of 
capital is the “appropriate discount rate for the project” (p. 174) and that ‘‘present value risk-adjusted 
discount rate … forms of this criterion are easily derived”  (footnote 8, p. 171) as is shown by a simple 
manipulation of the above inequation: 
   ( ) 0/~,/~cov1 00110 >+++− XrXXr
XX
mf λ
. 
The consequent decision rule boils down to “to accepting the project with the highest net present value’’ 
(footnote 14, p. 174). It is worth noting that such a NPV is a disequilibrium (cost-based) NPV. Its use is 
fostered in popular finance textbooks (e.g. Copeland and Weston, 1983, 1988; Weston & Copeland, 1988; 
Bøssaerts and Odegaard, 2001) and it is so widespread that Ang and Lewellen (1982) consider the 
disequilibrium NPV  “the standard discounting approach” (p. 9) in finance. Magni (2007a) shows that this 
unboundedly rational procedure suggested by Rubinstein deviates from an accepted standard of rationality: 
value additivity (warnings against the use of this NPV may be found in Ang & Lewellen, 1982; Grinblatt 
and Titman, 1998; Ekern, 2006).  In particular, the author shows that the NPV of a portfolio of projects is 
different from the sum of the NPVs of the projects (Magni, 2007a, Proposition 4.1). This implies that the 
disequilibrium NPV furnishes different evaluations (and different decisions) depending on to the way the 
course of action is depicted. Loosely speaking, to receive a 100$ banknote or to receive a 60$ banknote and 
a 40$ banknote is financially equivalent. Decision makers employing the disequilibrium NPV are trapped in 
a sort of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999) so that their evaluations differ depending on whether their 
                                           
9 “We also have some semantic problems defining exactly what is meant by the value of a non-traded project” (Smith 
and Nau, 1995, p. 804, footnote 7). 
10 In a private correspondence, Prof. Nau writes, referring to the assumption of complete markets: “this a strong 
idealization:  if markets are incomplete, then there are not Arrow securities for all the states” (July 2005). 
11 Rubinstein’s proposal is logically equivalent to other classical proposals presented in the late Sixties and early 
Seventies by such scholars as Mossin, Hamada, Tuttle and Litzenberger, Bierman and Hass (see Senbet & Thompson, 
1978, for a review). 
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outcomes are seen as aggregate or disaggregate quantities. This amounts to saying that the disequilibrium 
NPV is inconsistent with the principle of description invariance, which prescribes that valuations and 
decisions must be invariant under changes in description of the same alternatives. Violations of this 
principle are known in the heuristics-and-biases tradition as framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Soman, 2004).12 As opposed to the disequilibrium NPV, some scholars 
advocate the use of an equilibrium NPV (e.g. Bogue & Roll, 1974; Haley & Schall, 1979), which is 
logically deducted from the CAPM as well. It is often presented in the co-called the certainty-equivalent 
form: 
( )
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This equilibrium NPV is additive, but Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) and Magni (2007a, 2007b) show that 
under certain (realistic) assumptions on the market rate of return, this NPV violates the no-principle 
arbitrage.13 This means that a decision maker complying with the equilibrium NPV is subject to arbitrage 
losses. As a result, the equilibrium NPV is not consistent with a tenet which is considered a normative 
benchmark for rationality (see Nau & McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999). As a result, the CAPM-based NPVs 
displays deviations from accepted standards of rationality. 
 
4. NPV rule: heuristic or unboundedly rational model? 
The NPV rule (either the traditional version or the expanded one) is presented in the literature as the 
solution of an optimization problem (e.g. Fisher, 1930, Rubinstein, 1973, Dixit and Pyndick, 1994; 
McMinn, 2005). Despite this, there is evidence that it is a mixed methodology, a blending of logical and 
ecological rationality. As may be inferred by several historical surveys, it is the result of rigorous 
mathematical thinking associated to a more practical-oriented adaptive thinking of skilful decision makers. 
In a period where the quest for axiomatic models was cogent, Fisher (1930) just gave an optimization 
dressing to a technique that was practiced long since: since the times of Fibonacci’s present-value analysis 
(Goetzmann, 2005) in  12th century, contributions from mathematicians, engineering economists, and 
actuarial scientists nourished and were nourished by the non-optimizing evaluations of properties, trees, 
lands, collieries, coppices, buildings, leases, shops etc. made by the legal, banking, business communities 
(Wing, 1965; Edwards & Warman, 1981; Miller & Napier, 1993; Scorgie, 1996; Brackenborough, McLean 
& Oldroyd, 2001). The use of a mixed methodology consisting of a systematic discounting procedure 
subjectively adjusted to reflect personal judgment is exemplified in actual evaluations accomplished across 
centuries: Scorgie (1996), illustrating many cases, shows that since 13th  century “the capitalised value or 
selling price of arable land and other property was determined by multiplying the annual rental by some 
                                           
12 See also Haley & Schall (1979, pp. 182-183), for unreliability of the disequilibrium NPV in ranking projects. 
13 Magni (2007b) focuses on CAPM-based capital budgeting and shows that the derivative of the NPV function may 
be decreasing with respect to the end-of-period cash flow in some state of nature. Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) focuses 
on asset pricing and show that CAPM does not guarantee absence of arbitrage in the market. 
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generally accepted factor” (p. 240, italics added), which is interpretable as a discount factor. A valuation of 
Lord Cromwell’s property in 1469 was obtained by using a factor of 20.14 The latter only “provided a base 
valuation” (ibidem) and could be changed depending on the case at hand: “The provision for the use of 
another rate provided some leeway” (Scorgie, 1996, p. 240). Variations were governed by several domain-
specific factors, among which “the need to use a higher interest rate where an investment project involved 
hazards and uncertainty” (p. 242). For example, the risk of flooding for a coal mine could suggest to 
decrease the factor from 20 to 4 or to 3 (i.e. raise the discount rate to 25% or 33.33%) (p. 244). 
Brackenborough, McLean and Oldroyd (2001), focusing on the Tyneside coal industry in the 18th century, 
report the use of an NPV rule where cash flows “were discounted at interest rates to reflect the viewer’s 
assessment of risk” (p. 141, italics added), which means that that the “responsibility for assessing the degree 
of risk was placed firmly in the hand of the client” (p. 144). Quoting directly from original records,  they 
confirm that the discount rates reflected “the purchasers’ own ideas of the risk and prospects of the concern” 
and that the decision makers should “judge for himself, and draw his own conclusions” (p. 144). Analysts 
just provided the formal framework, while leaving investors to use the rule subjectively “through 
adjustment of the discount rate” (pp. 150-151). The use of this combined methodology is also confirmed in 
Wing (1965), who analyzes a paper by Van Deventer (1915) where a foreman provides the owner of a small 
machine shop with a rule for investment decisions: such a rule is just an unstated BR-NPV rule: “First, 
estimate the probable saving that the investment will make … Second, assign a probable length of life to it 
… Third, estimate what the investment will cost … Fourth, pick out a minimum rate of return that you will 
expect” (p. 475, italics added). That minimum rate of return is a “desired profit rate” (p. 475) in a satisficing 
sense. That the choice of the rate was meant to be subjective is confirmed by the table Van Deventer 
provides in his paper, which is addressed to the attention of the shop owner: it  “was supplied with a range 
of rates of return into which he could fit his personal minimum expected rate” (p. 479, italics added). This 
cooperation is brought into play even in the UR realm, though it is not recognized: an outstanding example 
is given by Dixit and Pindyck (1994)’s use of stochastic dynamic programming in the expanded NPV, 
where they explicitly leave decision makers free to set their own desired discount rates: “dynamic 
programming can … be used to maximize the present value of the firm’s expected flow of profits, subject to 
an arbitrary discount rate” (p. 149, italics added); “we can … use a dynamic programming approach with 
an exogenously specified discount rate” (p. 185,italics added); “The dynamic programming approach started 
by specifying the discount rate, ρ, exogenously as a part of the objective function” (p. 120). To present a 
maximization problem where the objective function depends on a subjectively determined hurdle rate 
means to suggest a blending of an UR procedure and a BR heuristic. Interestingly, the authors themselves 
are puzzled by their own proposal: “One problem with this investment rule is that it is based on an arbitrary 
…. discount rate ρ. It is not clear where this discount rate should come from” (p. 147). Yet, their book 
heavily relies (commendably) on this hybrid NPV rule. Even McDonald (2000), in presenting the “correct” 
                                           
14 The implicit discount rate is  5% =(1/20)*100. 
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maximization procedure, significantly admits:  “We will be agnostic about the determination of [the 
discount rate] ρ” (p. 16).  
One may even conjecture that the birth of the sophisticated version of the NPV rule (the expanded 
NPV) has been favored by the empirical findings on actual choice behaviors: some scholars may have been 
induced by these researches to construct a new enhanced NPV capable of explaining the empirical 
deviations from the well-entrenched NPV rule. This may be drawn implicitly from the concern about 
presenting a normative model able to explain and conform to actual choice behaviors:  
Some recent developments in the theory of investment under uncertainty have offered an 
 interesting new explanation of these phenomena … This new approach  suggests that textbooks 
 pictures of the dynamics of a competitive industry need … substantial redrawing”. (Dixit, 1992, p. 
 108, italics added)  
 
The real options literature can explain why using a discount rate that is higher than the cost of 
 capital is a good strategy when waiting opens up better opportunities. Such a discount rate is 
 typically referred to as the hurdle rate. (J&M, 2002, p. 13, italics added) 
 
The option insight also helps explain why the actual investment behaviour of firms differs 
 from the received wisdom taught in business schools. Firms invest in projects that are expected to 
 yield a return in excess of a required, “hurdle” rate … such hurdle rates are typically three or 
 four times the cost of capital   … firms do not invest until price rises substantially above long-run 
 average cost. On the downside, firms stay in business for lengthy periods while absorbing 
 losses, and price can fall substantially below average variable cost without disinvestment or exit. 
 This also seems to conflict with standard theory, but … it can be explained once 
 irreversibility and option value are accounted for. (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 7, italics added) 
 
We found qualitative implications, and several approximate quantitative ones, that conform to 
 experience―the high hurdle rates used by business firms when they judge investment projects, the 
 relative inefficacy of interest rate cuts as policies to stimulate investment projects, the significant 
 and detrimental effect of policy uncertainty on investment, and so on. (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 
 425) 
 
…there is considerable anecdotal evidence that firms make investment decisions in a way that is at 
 least roughly consistent with the theory developed in this book (for example, the use of hurdle rates 
 that are much larger than the opportunity cost of capital as predicted by the CAPM). (Dixit & 
 Pindyck, 1994, p. 296, italics added) 
 
These claims may be interpreted as a regard for understanding real-life decision makers’ behaviors and 
providing a theory that take account of decision makers’  actual choices. If decision makers do not abide by 
a normative theory, they should not be tagged as irrational. Rather, one could infer that theory exhibits 
“failures”, “anomalies” (Dixit & Pindyck, p. 4), “abstraction from reality (J&M; p. 5).15 There is a need of 
new theories that explain decision maker’s heuristics, which may give insights for construction of new 
theories and models that take account of information, context, environment and personal evaluation. The 
two sides of rationality should (at least attempt to) go along a common road: 
 Any decisions-making framework, however, can only improve a manager’s understanding of the 
 problem at hand and help him/her to make a more informed and consistent decision. No decision-
 making framework can guarantee a “good” outcome and there is no substitute for managerial effort, 
                                           
15 Dixit and Pindyck, as well as J&M’s, use empirical evidence to dismiss theories (traditional NPV, CAPM) that dot 
not comply with actual behaviors, not to tag actual choice behaviors as irrational. 
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 creativity, experience, knowledge, and critical thinking…” (Lander & Pinches, 1998, p. 542, italics 
 added).  
 
The quest for a fruitful cooperation of bounded and unbounded rationality is now compelling. 
 
Conclusions 
The heuristics-and-biases program draws attention on logical fallacies of human reasoning which 
cloud human minds (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1996). Choice behaviors are biased because they deviate from accepted standards of rationality; 
conversely, advocates of bounded rationality are concerned with showing that heuristics may often prove 
useful in decision-making (Gigerenzer, Todd & the ABC Research Group, 1999). The latter aver that 
cognitive illusions disappear once heuristics are seen as adaptive tools rather than logical devices for 
solving decision-making processes (Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer, 2000). Gigerenzer and the ABC group 
endorse the idea that human beings’ rationality is ecological rather than logical, and their fast-and-frugal-
heuristics program aims at presenting a number of heuristics that are successfully applied in real-life in 
specific environments. This work draws attention on the NPV maximization model, which is a keystone in 
economics and finance. The main results of this work may be summarized as follows: 
(1) Real-life decision makers often use the NPV methodology, but discount cash flows with a hurdle rate 
which differs from the cost of capital normatively suggested (e.g. CAPM, arbitrage pricing)  
(2) The hurdle-rate rule may be interpreted as a boundedly rational approach to investment decisions: 
decision makers rest on aspiration levels subjectively determined 
(3) Some empirical evidence show that the bounded-rationality approach is ecologically rational, domain-
specific, psychological plausible. The hurdle rate rule leads to close-to-optimal solutions when confronted 
with the expanded NPV 
(4) Several factors affect the hurdle rate: uncertainty, future opportunities, rationing of managerial skills, 
strategic considerations, agency costs, costs of external financing. This suggests that this approach is 
consistent with several theories and models: real options approach, resource-based theory, Top 
Management Team literature, agency theory, strategy literature. The hurdle rate seems to be set at a base 
level but may fluctuate around it depending on the drivers above cited 
(5) The NPV maximizing model is not univocal: it may take several different forms. The use a particular 
version depends on the circumstances: for example, the arbitrage-pricing NPV may not be used if the actual 
market is not complete. Some of the versions are often inapplicable and/or reveal deviations from accepted 
standards of rationality (additivity, no-arbitrage, description invariance) 
(6)  Both unboundedly rational NPV and boundedly rational NPV have their own shortcomings, if taken in 
isolation, but an interaction between the two system of reasoning may improve performance. Actually, the 
very distinction between the two is rather artificial and only useful as a metaphor (see Gigerenzer & Regier, 
1996): as attested by recent historical researches, the origins of the NPV lies in the common efforts of 
various categories of people facing the need of both logical and eco-logical rationality.  
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In such a way, the paper enters the debate as to whether unbounded or bounded rationality should be judged 
more apt to help decision makers. The latter rests primarily on the idea of heuristics as fruitful tools to be 
used in specific environments, the former focuses on the equation heuristics=biases, in the sense that 
heuristics are often considered internally inconsistent and for this reason inappropriate for decision-making. 
This paper is consistent with a bounded/ecological rationality approach (and, indeed, it recommends 
bounded and ecological rationality as a fruitful and indispensable vision of rationality): “the heuristics 
themselves are sensible estimation procedures that are by no measure “irrational”.” (Gilovich and Griffin, 
2002, p.  However, this paper may suggest a direction for research and act as a stimulus for further 
inquiries. The scientific niche that might be disclosed could offer unexpected views about bounded and 
unbounded rationality and their interrelations. A possible payoff of such a view is not solely that internal 
consistency is a double-edged weapon (and therefore one should not entirely base decision-making on it) 
but that bounded rationality and unbounded rationality are not necessarily rivals. This view is then 
consistent with a nondichotomous dual-process theory of reasoning, according to which individuals are 
furnished with two cognitive systems: a heuristic-based (intuitive) system and rule-based (analytic) systems 
that cooperate in producing answers to decision problems. Bounded and unbounded rationality may be 
viewed as two sides of the same medal. This seems to be the new direction of the heuristics-and-biases 
program. But the latter seems also interested to stress that System 1 (rule-based) and System 2 (heuristic-
based) do cooperate even though “the accuracy of (System 2) decision rules rests on the validity of a 
System 1 computation” (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 17). That System 1 is always superior to System 2 is 
here disconfirmed, since the rule-based model has its won biases as well. Also, to rigidly split our reasoning 
processes in two Systems may prove a useful metaphor for scientific research but often results in a 
simplistic explanation. One never knows where either System begins and where it ends, and the distinction 
between the two is rather fuzzy: it is not simple to ascertain what an association is and what a rule is, and to 
find clear-cut differences between them (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996).  Unbounded rationality itself, as 
derived from logic and mathematics, may not abstain to consider itself as a derivation of ecological 
rationality: logic and mathematics should be intended as the most advanced step of human simulation, and 
the impressive degree we have achieved in such an ability may be seen as the result of an evolutionary 
process, in which its surviving value has been adaptively tested. Simulation is a tool for anticipating and as 
such is indispensable for discovering and creating. Therefore logic and mathematics, as symbolic tools, 
assemble the experience of our ancestors (Monod, 1970, pp. 171-172), or, to put it in a nutshell, even logic 
is ecological.  
If a narrow interpretation of the two-process theory means that the two systems always give 
contradictory answers, then this paper aims at showing the opposite; if a less rigid interpretation of it is 
followed, then a dual-process theory may actually be of some help to understand (decision-making and) 
decision-making models. Evidently, such a theory cannot substitute a meticulous analysis of cognitive 
processes where focus is not placed on the opposition of the two systems but rather on the interaction 
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between the two and on the mechanisms that combine them, as well as on the theoretical question 
concerning how much of each reposes in the other. Certainly, “the two-systems view … helps to clarify the 
differences and similarities between the … “heuristics and biases” program and … the “fast and frugal 
heuristic” program” (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 16) and its “potential usefulness of analyses of this sort” 
(Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996) is undeniable. But 
collecting more and more binary oppositions—and labeling these “two-process theories”—does not 
necessarily enhance clarity. Dichotomies can be an important step, but they cannot substitute for 
theories of cognitive processes. (Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 293). 
 
More “fluid theories” and more blending will perhaps help us understand decisions makers and help 
decision makers cope with complex decision problems (with the pleasant by-product of conciliating the two 
rival parties). 
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